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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1#

What are the requirements before summary judgment

may be granted?
2.

What are the requirements before pleadings may

be stricken?
3.

What are the requirements before appellant's

affidavit in opposition of summary judgment may be stricken?
4.

Do material facts exist to give rise to both

contract and tort causes of action?
5.

Did facts exist to establish that criminal process

was improperly pursued in an attempt to enforce a civil debt?
6.

Was abuse of process present by plaintiffs1 influence

in the criminal prosecution?
1.

Were grounds established for defamation?

8.

Were grounds established for intentional infliction

of emotional distress?
9.

Were grounds established for negligent infliction

of emotional distress?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action based upon fraud -- specifically, that
the appellant knew at the time he submitted a stolen vehicle claim
to his insurance company, AMICA Mutual Insurance, and at the time
payment was received, that his vehicle was In possession of an auto
body shop which had performed repairs to the vehicle and which
-1-

asserted a lien against the automobile.

This action arose out of

the same facts which gave rise to the criminal prosecution of
appellant wherein he was accused of insurance fraud, tried, and
acquitted by a jury in April, 1985.

One week after this acquittal,

Respondent AMICA Mutual Insurance Company, hereinafter "AMICA,"
filed this instant civil action alleging the same facts as the
basis for its cause of action for fraud.
The appellant counter-claimed alleging generally that
Respondent AMICA breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing
with its own insured by initiating and pursuing the criminal action,
which amounted to per se defamation and malicious prosecution.
Both parties later amended their pleadings, specifying individual
causes of action.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On August 19, 1986, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
District Court Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the following motions came for hearing:
1.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion

for Summary Judgment;
2.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Companyfs Motion to

Strike Pleadings;
3.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion

to Strike Affidavits in Opposition;
4.

Third-Party Defendant National Automobile Theft

Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment; and,
-2-

5.

Third-Party Defendants James M. Black, Barbara J.

Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver, and R. LaMar Guiver's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Plaintiff's and Third-Party
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Motions to Strike
Affidavits, and Motions to Strike Defendant's Pleadings.

The date

of judgment was October 31, 1986.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW
In July, 1981, appellant's mother was involved in a car
accident while driving a 1980 Dodge Mirada automobile which the
appellant had leased and allowed his mother to use.
was insured under a policy issued by AMICA.

The vehicle

The vehicle was ordered

towed by the Utah Highway Patrol and was taken to Pioneer Dodge,
the nearest Dodge dealer to the site of the accident.

Several days

later, appellant alleges he was prevented from paying for the towing
charges and retrieving his vehicle by officials of Pioneer Dodge
who claimed they had already begun unauthorized repairs. Appellant
had just prior to this time entered into an agreement to purchase
a Chevrolet dealership in Heber City, Utah, and wanted to have the
car repaired there.
Appellant's dispute with Pioneer Dodge continued for some
ten months during which time the appellant was also involved in
litigation to secure his Chevrolet dealership.

When the appellant

finally was about to open his car dealership, he went to Pioneer
-3-

Dodge and disputed again their repair work and lack of authorization.
In May, 1982, the appellant removed the vehicle from Pioneer Dodge
without paying any repair bills.

He returned several days later

and argued with Wayne Schoenfeld, owner of Pioneer Dodge, over these
issues.

Appellant told Schoenfeld that he was going to sell the

car at the next auto auction and sue Pioneer Dodge for the difference
between its present value and the value at the time of the accident.
About one week later, on June 9, 1982, as appellant
prepared to take the car to auction, it turned up missing from the
driveway of his residence in Salt Lake County.

He called the

sheriff's office who investigated and noted that no notice had been
given to them of any repossession, which is standard practice by
auto dealers prior to making a repossessiona
Appellant proceeded to file a stolen vehicle report with
the sheriff's office and with AMIGA, for which he was paid the sum
of $6,925.00 for the total loss of his car.

Appellant alleges he

knew nothing further on this matter until his arrest some two years
later.
AMICA alleges that appellant knew his car had been
repossessed by Pioneer Dodge and relies on the telephone call Wayne
Schoenfeld alleges took place between himself and appellant.

AMICA

states it did not learn of the car's whereabouts until it had
already been sold to a third-party purchaser to satisfy the unpaid
repair bill at Pioneer Dodge.
Appellant alleges, based upon the documents he obtained
-4-

during the criminal proceedings, that AMICA and third parties
Black, Guiver, and National Automobile Theft Bureau, hereinafter
l!

NATB," made affirmative efforts to push and further the prosecu-

tion of appellant as a means to collect the money previously paid
to him for his vehicle total loss.

Appellant alleges that this

influence and pressure was exerted upon the sheriff1s office investigation and upon the county attorney1s office in order to secure a
criminal action against the appellant which would be cheaper and
easier than suing him for the disputed sum.

Furthermore, the

appellant was never contacted during this two year period by anyone
regarding any dispute over the payment of any insurance settlement
regarding this vehicle.
Appellant claims that the investigation and instigation
of criminal charges against him was done maliciously and wrongfully
giving rise to his various causes of action against AMICA and third
parties.

The third parties are the insurance adjusters, James M.

Black and R. LaMar Guiver, and NATB.

Appellant alleges that the

facts in this case support his causes of action for First Party
Bad Faith, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, Per Se Defamation,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligence.
Appellant alleges that the repeated acts of AMICA, Black,
Guiver, and NATB, as evidenced by their own documents, records,
and admissions during testimony, clearly establish the factual basis
to support his various causes of action.
Upon motions by AMICA and third parties, the lower court
-5-

g r a n t e d summary judgment on a l l of a p p e l l a n t f s c a u s e s of
and a l s o o r d e r e d s t r i c k e n a l l of a p p e l l a n t ' s s u p p o r t i n g

action
affidavits.

This o r d e r i s a l s o p a r t of t h i s a p p e a l , as t h e s e a f f i d a v i t s

are

t e s t i m o n y as t o p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s and knowledge of w i t n e s s e s ,
and no grounds e x i s t t o s t r i k e such t e s t i m o n y .
the testimony within these a f f i d a v i t s

However, most of

p e r t a i n s t o AMICA's motion

t o s t r i k e S c h e t t l e r f s p l e a d i n g s , f o r which t h e lower c o u r t

reserved

any r u l i n g .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
The lower c o u r t e r r e d by g r a n t i n g summary judgment and
s t r i k i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p l e a d i n g s - and a f f i d a v i t s

i n o p p o s i t i o n as a

m a t t e r of law, and t h e r e e x i s t e d m a t e r i a l d i s p u t e d

facts.

Facts existed to establish that criminal process was
improperly pursued in an attempt to enforce a civil debt.
There was abuse of process present by plaintiffs1 influence
in the criminal prosecution.
Grounds were established for defamation.
Grounds were established for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should be
reserved and the case remanded for trial by jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST
IN THIS CASE WHERE ACTS CONSTITUTING
-6-

BREACH OF CONTRACT ALSO RESULT IN
BREACHES OF DUTY THAT ARE INDEPENDENT
OF THE CONTRACT AND GIVE RISE TO
CAUSES OF ACTION IN TORT.
The case at bar presents a first-party relationship
between an insurer and its insured.

Hence, the duties and obliga-

tions of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary.
Ordinarily, without more, a breach of those implied or expressed
duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contracts, not
one in torts.
1985).

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchangp, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah

However, the Utah Supreme Court writes:
We recognize that in some capes the acts
constituting a breach of contract may also
result in breaches of duty tfiat are independent of the contract and (that may give
rise to causes of action in tort. Hal
Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmericja, 657 P.2d
at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire
Ins. Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example,
the law of this state recognizes a duty to
refrain from intentionally causing severe
emotional distress to others. Samms v.
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344
(Utah 1961). Thus, intentional and outrageous conduct by an insurer against an
insured, coupled with a failure to bargain,
could conceivably result in port liability
independent of (and concurrent with)
liability for breach of contract.
Additionally, the facts that give rise to
a breach of the duty to bargain in good
faith could also amount to fraudulent
activity, rendering an insurer independently
liable for damages flowing from the fraud.
See Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal.
App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr. 7641(1968).
Also, under various unfair practices acts,
there may be statutory requirements that
give rise to independent causes of action.
E.g., UCA 1953, §31-27-1 to ^4.
Id., at 800, n. 3.
-7-

In reviewing the implied contractual obligation to
perform a f i r s t - p a r t y insurance contract in good faith, the Court
notes :
Few cases define the implied contractual
obligation to perform a first-party
insurance contract in good faith. However,
because the considerations are similar,
we freely look to the tort cases that have
described the incidence of the duty of
good faith in the context of first-party
insurance contracts. From those cases
and from our own analysis of the obligations
undertaken by the parties, we conclude that
the implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the very least,
that the insurer will diligently investigate
the.facts to enable it to determine whether
a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the
claim, and will thereafter act promptly
and reasonably in rejecting or settling
the claim.
Id., at 801.
In the case at bar, the record indicates that a genuine
issue of material fact clearly exists whether Mr. Schettler knew
the automobile in question was stolen, and whether AMICA diligently
investigated the facts to enable it to determine whether a valid
mechanic's lien existed, to name but two of the factual problems
in this case.
In addition the Court states:
The duty of good faith also requires the
insurer to "deal with layman as layman
and not as experts in the subtleties of
law and underwriting11 and to refrain
from actions that will injure the insured's
ability to obtain the benefits of the
contract.
Id. , (citations omitted).
-8-

Clearly, a genuine issue of material fact also exists
whether AMICA, particularly in conjunction with the third parties,
breached its duty of good faith in dealing with layman as layman,
and whether through its pursuit of the criminal matter refrained
from actions that would injure Mr. Schettlerfs ability to obtain
the benefits of contract.

Such distinctions are significant

because:
These performances [of good faith] are
the essence of what the insured has
bargained and paid for, and the insurer
has the obligation to perform them.
When an insurer has breached this duty,
it is liable for damages suffered in
consequence of that breach.
Id., (citations omitted).
POINT II
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT CONDEMNS THE USE
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS TO ENFORCE A
CIVIL DEBT.
This case involves the use of the criminal process to
enforce a civil debt.

The Utah Supreme Court and Utah statute,

§76-19-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, have both condemned
this approach even if the complainant is owed the debt.

Greenwell

v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 575 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1978); Haas v.
Emmett, 23 Utah 2d 138, 459 P.2d 432 (Utah 1969).
ecution may be used to punish such conduct.

Malicious pros-

Haas v. Emmett, supra;

Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 193-94, 299 P.2d
622, 626 (Utah 1956).

The Utah Supreme Court occasionally implied

defendantfs bad faith from the mere effort to call on the police.
-9-

Utah a l s o borrows from the malicious prosecution d o c t r i n e
to allow s u i t s for t h e wrongful bringing of c i v i l a c t i o n s .

Baird

v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l School Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 (1976); Perkins
v. Stephens, 28 Utah 2d 436, 503 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1972).
term malicious prosecution i s used for these a c t i o n s .

Often the
Leigh Furnitur<

v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308-309 (Utah 1982); Perkins v. Stephens,
supra.

The Court has recognized such actions for using groundless

c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n t o damage a n o t h e r ' s b u s i n e s s .

Leigh F u r n i t u r e v.

Isom, supra, a t 309.
In the case at b a r , a p p e l l a n t properly pleaded t h e above
cause and genuine issues of m a t e r i a l fact e x i s t as to t h e conduct
of an independent p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n and an independent deputy
county a t t o r n e y and t h e influence of AMIGA and t h i r d - p a r t y
respondents in a p p e l l a n t ' s criminal p r o s e c u t i o n .
POINT I I I
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS
WHETHER THE INFLUENCE OF AMIGA AND THE
THIRD-PARTY RESPONDENTS IN APPELLANT'S
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION CONSTITUTES ABUSE
OF PROCESS.
A variant of the malicious prosecution action is the action
for abuse of process.

The core of the action is a "perversion of

the process to accomplish some improper purpose, such as compelling
its victim to do something which he would not otherwise be legally
obligated to do.1' Crease v. Pleasant Grove, 30 Utah 2d 451, 519
P.2d 888 (Utah 1974); see, Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985),
And, the cause of action may arise even though an action has been
-10-

properly started and process lawfully issued.

Crease v. Pleasant

Grove, supra, 519 P.2d at 890.

In the case at b a r , a p p e l l a n t properly pleaded t h a t
cause and a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l fact e x i s t s as to whether
the action by the above-mentioned p a r t i e s rose to such a l e v e l .
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION IS
ACTIONABLE.
A prima facie case of defamation, as defined in
RESTATEMENT (2d) TORTS, §588 (1977), includes four main elements:
(a)

a false and defamatory statement concerning another;

(b)

an unprivileged publication to a third party;

(c)

fault amounting to at least negligence on the part

of the publisher; and,
(d)

either actionability of the statement irrespective

of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication.
Under the common law, publishers of defamatory falsehoods
concerning private individuals were held strictly liable.

Herbert

v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159, n. 4 (1979).
Utah statutes define libel or slander as !fa malicious
defamation. . . tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead,
or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or
publish the natural defects of one who is ^live, and thereby expose
him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.11
-11-

UCA, §45-2-2,

UCA,

§76-9-501 substitutes "defame or darken" for "blacken."

a 1905

Utah Supreme Court case, Nichols v. Daily Reporter, offered a
similar definition:
...derogatory or disparaging words
which impute to a person the commission
of a crime or degradation of character,
or which have a tendency to injuriously
affect him in his office or trust,
profession, trade, calling, or business,
or which tend to degrade him in society,
or expose him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule.
30 Utah 74, 77, 83 Pac. 573, 574 (1905).

The Nichols case continues

to be cited in recent Supreme Court opinions.
v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah 1984).

E.g., Auto West Inc.

In a 1975 opinion the

Utah Supreme Court described the "traditional" requirement of libel
and slander as being "to hold a person up to hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, or to injure him in his business or vocation."

Prince

v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975).
Utah statutes distinguish between libel and slander.
Libel is defamation "expressed either by printing or by signs or
pictures or the like...." UCA, §45-2-2(1).
communicated by spoken words."

Slander is "any libel

Id., at §45-2-2(2).

The distinction

is important primarily in determining what evidence of damages
must be presented.
Utah allows an action for slander to proceed without an
allegation of special harm only if the words fall into one of four
categories:

"(1) charge of criminal conduct; (2) charge of a

loathesome disease; (3) charge of conduct that is incompatible with
-12-

the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or office;
and (4) charge of the unchastity of a woman.!f

Daum v. Gillman,

967 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983); All red v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320
(1979).

In the instant case, while there is no question but that

slander exists, libel may also be present.

Charges of criminal

conduct as well as a charge of conduct that is incompatible with
the exercise of a lawful business, trade, or profession exists.
In slander cases damage to reputations is presumed from the nature
of the words and plaintiff need not show specific damage.
A similar damage requirement applies in libel cases.
Rather than using the four slander categories, a libel per se is
one which from its nature must as a natural consequence cause
plaintiff "pecuniary harm.11

Western States Title Ins. Co. v.

Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 72, 415 P.2d 316, 317 (Utah 1966); Nichols
v. Daily Reporter, supra, 30 Utah at 77, 83 Pac. at 574. A libel
per se requires no specific showing of damages since damages are
presumed.
In addition, the Court has either held or refrained from
questioning findings by lower courts that it was defamatory per se
to state plaintiff was a "clever crook" and "stealing from his
own children," Prince v. Peterson, supra,

See similarly, Auto

West Inc. v. Baggs, supra; Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th
Cir. 1981)("bagman for Spiro Agnew"); Simpson v. Steen, 127 F.Supp.
132 (D. Utah 1954) ("claim jumping"); and had "forged his mother's
name to a check and taken the money," Hales v. Commercial Bank,
-13-

114 Utah 186, 197 P. 2d 910 (Utah 1948).
Court opinions further require that the defamatory
language be "of and concerning11 the plaintiff.

Kirkham v.

Sweet ring, 108 Utah 397, 400, 160 P. 2d 435, 437 (1945); Malouf v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Utah 175, 191, 283 Pac. 1065, 1069
(1929); Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 51 Utah 322, 170 Pac. 770
(1918); Burton v. Matt son, 50 Utah 133, 166 Pac. 979 (1917) (when
it is obvious defamation concerns plaintiff it need not be pleaded
that words are "of and concerning him").
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moreover, take a
non-technical approach to pleading defamatory matters.

Rule 9(j)(l)

does not require plaintiff to "set forth any extrinsic facts showing
the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter... but it
is sufficient to state generally the same was published or spoken
concerning the plaintiff."
Here, the record clearly indicates that a defamatory
statement was published or spoken concerning Mr. Schettler.

As

such, as a private citizen, Mr. Schettler may properly proceed in
this action.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS AGAINST CROSSCLAIMANTS PROPERLY ESTABLISH A CLAIM
FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a person flwho
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another through
-14-

extreme and outrageous conduct is liable to that person for any
resulting damages."

Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700

(Utah 1985), citing Restatement of Torts 2d, §46.

See also,

Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188, 298-300 (D.Utah 1982), afffd.,
745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).
injury is required.
(Utah 1961).

Neither bodily contact nor physical

Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344

Defendant is liable if he intended to inflict emotional

distress or reasonably should have known that distress would result.
The Court has recognized that the action may lie when a
defendant made repeated proposals for sexual relations to a married
woman, Samms v. Eccles, supra, and when a tenant was forcefully
evicted by the defendant who unlawfully retained the tenant's personal possessions.

Pentecost v. Harward, supra.

In the case at bar, appellant properly pleaded the above
cause and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
the actions of AMICA and the third parties fall within these
parameters.
POINT VI
APPELLANT PROPERLY PLEADED THE ELEMENTS
OF NEGLIGENCE AND A GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER AMICA
AND THE THIRD-PARTY RESPONDENTS OWED
A DUTY OF DUE CARE TO APPELLANT.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the "essential
elements11 of a negligence action as: "(1) a duty of reasonable care
owed by the defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) the causation, both actually and proximately, of injury; and
-15-

(4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff.11
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).

Williams v.

See_ also, Allen v. United

States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984).
The focal point in the case at bar is the breach of duty.
That is typically a jury question.

Williams v. Melby, supra, at

727; Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); Jackson v.
Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); FMA Acceptance Co. v.
Leatherby Insurance, 594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979); Jensen v.
Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 406, 367 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1962).
In the case at bar, the question exists as to whether
AMICA or any of the third parties owed any duty to appellant to more
fully investigate the instant facts prior to pursuing criminal
prosecution and whether they owed appellant a duty of informing
him of a dispute prior to having him arrested.

In addition, a

question exists whether appellant has a separate negligence action
or whether it is incorporated into his Bad Faith action.
CONCLUSION
For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d above, a p p e l l a n t r e q u e s t s

the

Court t o r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g of P l a i n t i f f ' s

and

T h i r d - P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s ' Motions f o r Summary Judgment, Motion t o
Strike Affidavits,

and Motions t o S t r i k e D e f e n d a n t ' s

Pleadings.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant respectfully
Category No. 1 3 ( b ) .
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r e q u e s t s o r a l argument under

Respectfully submitted this

[CO

\ M-t^-j^day of September,

1987.
HANSEN & HANSEN

800 Bo scon
Building
9 Exchange P l a c e
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 322-2467
Attorneys for Appellant

By X-TC^CK

,4-A^W

A c

,

> h i r L. Hansen
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e _ M | £ ^ > c r a y of

September,

1987, f o u r (4) c o p i e s of B r i e f of A p p e l l a n t were s e r v e d on each of
the

following:
S. B a i r d Morgan, Esq,
Mark J . T a y l o r , Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
A t t o r n e y s f o r Respondent
S i x t h F l o o r Boston B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Robert R. W a l l a c e , E4q.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendants and Respondents
175 So. West Temple, S u i t e 650
S a l t Lake City,
Utah 84101
Wesley M. Lang, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant and Respondent
175 So. West Temple, S u i t e 510
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM
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Lawrence L. Summerhays,#3l55
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

]
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER

1

Civil No.

Defendant.
• i

For cause of action against defendant, the plaintiff
complains and alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That the plaintiff is, a mutual insurance company

licensed and qualified to do business in the State of Utah.
2.

That the defendant ig a resident of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
3.

That at all times herein mentioned, AMICA

Insurance Co, had issued to Carl F. Schettler, defendant
herein, a policy of insurance covering his 1980 Dodge 8
Mirada hardtop motor vehicle having an identification number
of XH22GAR142858 . Said policy of insurance, among other
coverages, included collision and comprehensive including
theft,
4. The insured vehicle was involved in an accident

to* V

^ n J*^1

and on

July 9, 1981, a repair estimate in the amount

/rNx>^xof $2,965 was obtained for the repair of said vehicle at
h^#

Pioneer Dodge Center, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The repairs were

completed and the final repair bill amounted to the sum of
$3#165.75.

The insured submitted said bill to the plaintiff

herein for payment and plaintiff made payment of the defendant's
claim for the repairs by issuing and delivering its draft to th€
defendant herein, payable to defendant and Chrysler Credit
Corporation, the financing agency for the defendant.
5.
to Pioneer

The defendant/insured failed to make payment

Dodge Center, the repairing garage and prior to

June 9, 1982, the defendant/insured had his vehicle towed, from
the Pioneer Dodge Center to his home without the consent,
knowledge or permission of Pioneer Dodge Center; that on or
about June 9, 1982, Pioneer Dodge Center located the vehicle
at the home of the defendant herein and had the vehicle towed
back to the Pioneer Dodge Center.
6.

On June 9, 1982 at about 6:34 p.m. the defendant

reported the vehicle to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office as
having been stolen from his premises.
On or about the 10th day of June 1982, the insured
called Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld, owner of Pioneer Dodge Center and
was told by Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld that the vehicle was at the
Pioneer Dodge Center.

On the 22nd day of June 1982, defendant/

insured completed a proof of loss form reporting the vehicle as
having been stolen and delivered the same to the plaintiff/
insurance company-heraia^

7.

On the 8th day of July 1982, the plaintiff/

surance company delivered its draft no. 1824946 in the sum of
$6,925 payable to Carl F. Schettler and Chrysler Credit
Corporation,to the defendant herein in payment of the theft/loss
of his vehicle and the defendant deposited said draft and
collected the amount thereof.
8.

At the time defendant filed his proof of loss

claiming the vehicle was stolen, he knew that said vehicle was
in the possession of Pioneer Dodge Center and that said company
had a mechanic's lien on said vehicle for the reasonable value
of the repairs that had been performed on said vehicle by
said company and also knew that said Pioneer Dodge Center was
entitled to the lawful possession of said vehicle by virtue
of said mechanic's lien, that it was hot stolen and that the
filing of a claim for the value of said vehicle under the
policy of insurance constituted a fraud on the part of the
defendant, against plaintiff/insurance co.
9.

As a proximate result £>f said fraudulent conduct

upon the part of the defendant, the pfLaintiff sustained the
following damages:
1.

Loss of $6,925.00, the amount paid to

the insured/defendant in payment of the
defendant's claim for the theft/loss of
his vehicle together with interest thereon
from the 8th day of July 1|982 to date of judgment.
2.

Costs of plaintiff's investigation by its

own staff and those hired by plaintiff to
investigate the theft/loss of said vehicle of

defendant in the sum of $1,440.39.
3.

A reasonable attorney's fee necessarily

incurred by plaintiff in its investigation
of the theft and for the filing and handling
of this lawsuit.
4.

Costs of court necessarily incurred in

connection with the prosecution of this
lawsuit.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment on its first
cause of action as follows:
1.

Damages in the amount of $6,925.00 paid to the

defendant for the theft/loss of his vehicle together with
interest from the 8th day of July 1982 to the date of judgment.
2.

Costs of plaintiff's investigation of the alleged

theft/loss of said vehicle in the sum of $1,440.39 plus interest
3.

A reasonable attorney's fee necessarily incurred

by plaintiff in its investigation and the filing and handling
of this lawsuit.
4.

Costs of court necessarily incurred in connection

with the prosecution of this lawsuit.
5.

Such other and further relief as the court

deems just and proper.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
10.

For a second cause of action plaintiff adopts

all of the allegations set forth in paragraph one through nine
of the First Cause of Action as though the same were set out
in full herein.
11.

That the conduct of the defendant in submitting

c$&s

c$^
,V

cla

^ m ^or

the

theft of

his automobile and accepting

an^/cashing the draft issued in payment of the theft of the
y^car when he knew that the same was in the possession of

/

V*

Pioneer Dodge Center, which had a right to hold it under its
possessory lien for payment of the repair bill constituted a fraud
against the plaintiff and plaintiff is entitled to recover
punitive damages therefor.
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays for judgment on his
Second Cause of Action by way of punitive damages in the sum
of $100,000.00 and for such other relief as the court deems
just and proper.
DATED this

day of April, 1985.
STRONG & HANNI

Lawrence L. Summei^a^s

Serve Defendant at:
5893 Tolcate Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

J 1IAR0LD CALL 0540
J|tAj«;orney f o r D e f e n d a n t / P l a i n t i f f
t.\5?0ft.VuflW Uorth Main S t r e e t
Suite 3
mJfcSer C i t y , Utah 84032
Telephone:
(801) 654-0742
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff

ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

«vs*
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant
and
CARL F." SCHETTLER,
Third Party Plaintiff
C i v i l No.
•vs*
JAMES M. BLACK and
BARBARA J. BLACK dba BLACK,
NICHOLS & GUIVER and R.
LaMAR GUIVER,
Third Party Defendants
Comes now the defendant and answers the Complaint of the
plaintiff as follows:
1.

Said Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon whi<

this court can grant relief.
2.

Admits the allegations of Paragraphs one and two of the

First Cause of Action.
ROLD CALL
I N « Y AT

..A*

(N m a » « I I I

3.

Admits in Paragraph Three that the plaintiff did issue to

the defendant a policy of insurance but denies that said policy of
insurance was in effect at all times mentioned in Paragraph Three.
4.

In Paragraph-Four, this defendant admits the vehicle in

question was involved in an accident but denies the other allegations of said paragraph.
5.

Denies the allegations of Paragraph Five.

6.

Admits the first paragraph of Paragraph Six but denies the

balance of said Paragraph Six.
7.

Admits the allegations of Paragraph Seven but denies

Paragraphs Eight and Nine and denies every part of said Complaint
that is not specifically admitted herein.
8.

Denies each and ever allegation of Paragraphs Ten and

Eleven of the Second Cause of Action.
COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
By way of Counterclaim and a further answer to the Complaint
and as a Complaint against the Third Party Defendants, Defendant
Schettler alleges as follows:
1.

Arnica Mutual Insurance Company is required by law to use

M

good faith, abstain from deception and practice honesty and equity

in all insurance matters.11

The same responsibility rests upon its

representatives and all have "the duty of preserving inviolate integrity of insurance.11

The plaintiff and third party defendants

have violated this duty they owed to the Defendant Schettler in that
-2.0 CALL
AT L>V»

(a)

Plaintiff and third party defendants conspired to use
the criminal process to attempt to force Defendant
Schettler to pay money to the plaintiff;

(b)

Plaintiff and third party defendants knew for 13
months that the motor vehicle had been located, but
they failed to notify the defendant or discuss the ma
ter with him, but conspired as to how they could use
the criminal process to harass the defendant in an
attempt to force him to pay money;

(c)

Plaintiff and third party defendants failed to protec
the personal property belonging to Defendant Schettle
that was in said automobile or aid or assist in its
recovery or return of the Dealer Plates on said
automobile;

(d) The Salt Lake County Sheriff and Salt Lake County
Attorneyfs Office finally agreed to issue a Warrant
of Arrest against the Defendant Schettler and charge
him with "Insurance Fraud", but only after they had
been constantly urged and prodded by plaintiff and
third party defendants even though the sheriff and
county attorney at first said there was not sufficien
evidence to arrest the defendant;
(e)

Plaintiff had a valid title to the motor vehicle in
question and when the said vehicle was located about
December 22, 1982, plaintiff could have claimed the
-3-

motor vehicle and recovered their loss, but they chose
not to do so and violated the duty they owed the defendant by using the criminal process in an attempt to
force Schettler to pay the loss;
(f)

Plaintiff and third party defendants are aware that
the second title issued to said motor vehicle through
efforts of Pioneer Dodge, is void and invalid, but the
plaintiff and third party defendants have taken no
action to assert their valid title to said motor vehicle but rather chose to charge Defendant Schettler
with "Insurance Fraud11;

(g) Plaintiff and third party defendants aided Pioneer
Dodge in keeping the defendant from his property and
assisted and aided Pioneer Dodge in keeping the location of the motor vehicle secret from defendant,
2.

That as a direct result of plaintiff and third party defen-

dants' actions, Defendant Schettler has suffered extreme mental
anguish and torment in that:
(a)

Defendant Schettler has an aged mother who would suff e
physically and mentally if she knew her son had been
arrested for "Insurance Fraud";

(b)
j

No one in the Schettler Family has ever been arrested
other than minor traffic violations, and the shame and
embarrassment to the defendant were more than he could
bear;
-4-

(c) The Schettler name is an honorable name in
has been from early pioneer times.

Utah and

The thought that

defendant was arrested for an act mala in se and
maybe convicted thereof, and that he would be the firs
to besmirch the family name, caused the defendant
great mental and physical anguish and torment.
3.

As a direct consequence of the mental and physical anguish

and torment suffered by the defendant as the direct result of the
actions of the plaintiff and third party defendants, Defendant
Schettler:
(a)

suffered a loss of his own self-esteem;

(b) has suffered and is suffering from lack of self- confidence;
(c) his ability to rationalize has been and is lessened;
(d)

Schettler has lost interest in his car business and
as a direct result his business has gone from a Fifty
Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollar a month profit to a loss
per month and he is now being forced to sell the same,

4.

That the actions of the plaintiff and third party defendant

have caused damage to the Defendant Schettler in the sum of Fifteen
Million ($15,000,000.00) Dollars.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

For a Second Cause of Action in this Counterclaim, defen-

dant adopts all of the allegations as set forth above as if the
same were set out fully herein.
.0 CALL
' AT LAW
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2.

The conduct of the plaintiff and third party defendants as

set forth above, were willful, malicious, and deliberate, and done
with intent to harm the Defendant Schettler and he is entitled to
punitive damages in the sum of One Hundred Million ($100,000,000.00)
Dollars.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

Fifteen Million ($15,000,000.00) Dollars on the First

Cause of Action;
2.

The sum of One Hundred Million ($100,000,000.00) Dollars

on the Second Cause of Action;
3.

That plaintifffs Complaint be dismissed;

4.

For costs of court and such other and further relief as

may be just and proper.
DATED this 7th day of June, 1985.

'Harold Call

«G

&&JL-

Attorney for Defendant Schettler
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer, Counter
claim and Third Party Complaint was served up the Plaintiff Arnica
Mutual Insurance by mailing a true copy to its attorney, Lawrence
JL. Summerhays at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT
[34111, this 10th day of June, 1985.
V "

LO CAUL
tAIU

TO

HENRY E. HEATH, 1441
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

]
]

vs.

]

CARL F. SCHETTLER,

]

Defendant.

]1

)
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

]
]
]

vs.

]

JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS &
GUIVER, and R. LaMAR GUIVER,
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE
THEFT BUREAU,

]
]
]i
]
]

Civil No. C85-2687

Third-Party

]1

Judge Dean E. Conder

Defendants.

)

Plaintiff, Arnica Mutual Insurance Company, by and
through its attorneys of record, moves the above-entitled court
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for

A2

-1-

summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim of defendant and
third-party plaintiff, Carl F. Schettler.

This motion is made on

the grounds and for the reasons that as a matter of law, defendant's counterclaim fails to state a cogniiable claim against
plaintiff.

This motion is more particularly based on plaintiff's

memorandum of points and authorities to be submitted herewith.
Respectfully submitted this */1

cfiay of May, 1986.

STRONG & HANNI

i. Baitd Morgan/
Attorneys for ^lair^fiff
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and Correct copy of the
foregoing Motion was hand-delivered this H*
1986,

day of June,

to the following:
Edward Flint
Attorney for Defendant
3105 Plateau Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Robert Wallace - Mailed First-Class
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Ut^h 84101
Wesley M. Lang - Mailed First-Class
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utjih 84101

CfofiJW
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l^jfliT^

Tc^c/A'^b^.zr:
HENRY E. HEATH, 1441
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

]
]
]

vs.

CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.

JAMES M. BLACK and
BARBARA J. BLACK dba BLACK
NICHOLS & GUIVER and R.
LaMAR GUIVER, and NATIONAL
AUTOMOBILE THEFT BUREAU,

1
))
)
]>
)

MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT
CARL F. SCHETTLER'S
PLEADINGS AND TO ENTER
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFF

\
;
]i

Civil No. C85-2687

]>

Judge Dean E. Conder

)
]
;
]
]

Third-Party

]

Defendants.

]

Arnica Mutual Insurance Company, by and through its
attorneys of record, moves the court for an order striking Carl F.
Schettler's pleadings, including answers, counterclaims, and
third-party complaints, and entering a default judgment in favor

-1-

of the plaintiff on the plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff Arnica

reserves the right to seek additional or alternative sanctions as
provided by law.
This motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum,
and is based on the pleadings and deposition transcripts on file
herein.
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company requests oral argument on
the motion pursuant to Rule 2, Rules of Practice for the Third
Judicial District Court.
DATED this

day of June, 1986.
STRONG & HANNI

By.

\Awl\l

Henry E.' flefeth
S. Baird Morgan
Mark J. TW4or

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was hand-delivered this M ^

day of June,

1986, to:
Ed Flint
Attorney for Defendant
3105 Plateau Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Robert R. Wallace- Mailed first-class
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Wesley M. Lang - Mailed first-class
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants

C V u ^ fvy?.i frr^ag,
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Jay E. Jensen, #1676
Wesley M. Lang, #4613
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant
National Automobile Theft Bureau
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant and
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS,
& GUIVER, and R. LAMAR GUIVER,
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE THEFT,
BUREAU,

Civil Number:
Judge:

C 85 2687

Dean E. Conder

Third-Party Defendants.
Third party defendant National Automobile Theft Bureau
by and through its attorneys of record hereby move this court for
an order granting it Summary Judgment in the above entitled case.
This motion is accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities.

- 1 -

.is fa/
^/_f-day
DATED this
^ day of _Qu
\JU

n<L
n<^

1986.

CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

g£

Jay E. Je/fs^rf'
Wesley M>^ang
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant National Automobile
Theft Bureau
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NOV 3 1986
HENRY E. HEATH,

\hk\

H. Dixon Hindle^plerk^rd 0*st. Court

S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J-. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

By

>S ^QgTOVlrO
C^puty Clbrk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMIGA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

\
\)
)
\
\
]

vs.

]

JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS &
GUIVER, and R. LaMAR GUIVER,
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE
THEFT BUREAU,

]
)
)i
)
)•

Third-Party
Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND ORDER

Civil No. C85-2687
Judge Richard Moffat

)
)

WHEREAS, on August 19, 1986, before the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat, District Court Judge of the above-entitled court, the
following motions having come for hearing:
1.

A3

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for

-1-

Summary Judgment;
2.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to

Strike Pleadings;
3.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to

Strike Affidavits in Opposition;
4.

Third-party defendant National Automobile Theft

Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment;
5.

Third-party defendants James Black, Barbara Black,

dba Black, Nichols & Guiverfs and R. LaMar Guiver1s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
AND WHEREAS, the following parties and counsel being
present:
1.

Henry E. Heath, S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. Taylor,

attorneys for plaintiff and third-party defendant AMICA Mutual
Insurance Company;
2.

Robert Wallace, attorney for James Black, Barbara

Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver, and R. LaMar Guiver, thirdparty defendants.
3.

Jay Jensen and Wesley Lang attorneys for National

Automobile Theft Bureau, third-party defendant;
4.

Phil Hansen and Ed Flint attorneys and Carl Schettler

personally, for and on behalf of defendant and third-party plaintiff Carl F. Schettler.
AND WHEREAS, the court having heard argument from counsel
with regard to the above-described motions and having reviewed the
memoranda, affidavits, depositions and other pleadings of record;
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AND WHEREAS, the defendant and third-party plaintiff, by
and through counsel of record having stipulated in open court that
the cause of action based on conversion be dismissed and also that
all third-party claims against third-party defendant Barbara Black
be dismissed and this court having previously so ordered;
AND WHEREAS, the court expressly finding, pursuant to
Rule 5i(b) of i:he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no
just reason for delay and that the dismissal of all claims of the
counterclaim of defendant and third-party plaintiff shall be a
final judgment;
AND WHEREAS, the court having provided additional time to
defendant and third-party plaintiff to file additional points and
authorities and affidavits in opposition to said motions and none
having been filed, and the court being otherwise fully advised in
the premises now enters its judgment and order as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff and third-party defendant
AMICA Mutual Insurance Company is hereby granted.

The Motion for

Summary Judgment of third-party defendant National Automobile
Theft Bureau is hereby granted.

The Motion for Summary Judgment

of James Black, Barbara Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver and R.
LaMar Guiver is hereby granted.

AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's

Motion to Strike Affidavits of Elizabeth B. Stewart, Reid W.
Gerritsen, Debra Ann Murdock, Lisa Hewiston, Lowell V. Summerhays,
Fredrick W. Green and Jim Hanson in opposition to its Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
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The Motion of AMICA Mutual

Insurance Corapany to Strike Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff's
Pleadings as Sanctions is hereby reserved for ruling at a later

time.

y'
DATED t h i s

_3 / ^

, 1986.

day of^££

ATTEST
. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

BY

deputy Clark

Judge

ftKRT?rxe.vrs OF HAND-DELIVERY
I &£St£SY CE3WIF1* that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Sesaawtry "Judgednt and Order was hand-delivered this
Octobar, 19S6, to the following:
Phil Hansen
Attorneys for Carl F. Schcttler
#800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Robert Wallace
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101
Wesley Lang
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
#900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

O'QAPVA
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day of

